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COMES NOW, the Appellant, City of Boise City, by aid through its attorneys of record,
and hereby files its initial brief in the above-captioned matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal involves the con~plicatedrelationship between cities, counties and the district

courts in Idaho and specifically presents for resolution the question whether the district court
can, under the current statutory scheme, order the City of Boise to provide facilities, personnel
and equipment for a Magistrate's Division of the District Court when Ada County is already
providi~~g
those same facilities, personnel and equipment at taxpayer's expense.
11.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On September 14, 2007, the City of Boise filed a Petition to set aside an Administrative

Order dated October 9, 1980, which required the City of Boise to provide facilities and
equipment for a Magistrate's Division of the Fourth Judicial District Court. (R., pp. 6 - 11) Ada
County moved to intervene and objected to setting aside the 1980 Administrative Order. (R., pp.
17 - 28) Over Boise City's objection to the intervention by Ada County (R., pp. 31 - 38), the
District Judges allowed Ada County to Intervene and oppose Boise City's Petition to Set Aside
the 1980 Administrative Order. (R., pp. 44 - 50) Afrer oral argument before the Fourth Judicial
i,

District Judges en bane, the District Court denied Boise City's Pdti'tion to Set Aside the 1980
Administrative Order in a Memorandum Decision filed on May 16, 2008. (R., pp. 60 - 76) The
City of Boise filed its Notice of Appeal on June 19,2008.

111.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A historical perspective is necessary to fully appreciate the position in which the City of

Boise found itself in 2007. The relevant history begins with the Idaho court reform legislation
which was enacted in 1969 and became effective in 1971. (R., pp. 60 - 62) Of particular
significance to this case are Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and 2218 which were part of the court reform
legislation. Idaho Code $ 1-2217 requires counties to provide quarters, facilities, equipmei~t,
staff, supplies and other expe~~ses
for the magistrate's division of the district court. Cities,
however, are oilly required "upon order of a majority of the district judges in the judicial district"
to provide quarters, facilities, equipment, staff, supplies and other expenses for the magistrate's
division ofthe district court.
a. The City of Boise Initially Provided Magistrate Services in 1971 when the
Court Reform Legislation became Effective.
On January 11, 1971, the effective date of the court reform Iegislation, the district judges
of the Fourth Judicial District entered ail order requiring the City of Boise to "provide suitable
and adequate quarters for two magistrates of the Fourth District Court Magistrates Division,
including two courtrooms with related facilities . . . ." (R., p. 10) Boise City complied with the
Order by continuing to provide facilities to handle Boise City's misdemeanors and traffic court
in an old fire station on Koote~laiStreet in Boise. (R., p. 63; R. Eji. 19, Second Navano Aff.,

.t
para. 7)
b. Nine Years Later, Boise City constructed the Barrister facility to house a
"Magistrate's Division of the District Court."

On October 9, 1980, the district judges of the Fourth Judicial District entered a new order
requiring the City of Boise to provide quarters, facilities, equipment, staff, supplies and other

with the Order and built a court facility with five courtrooms, cornmoi~lycalled Banister, and
provided other facilities, equipment, staff, supplies and expenses to operate it.
To help fund the Barrister facility, Boise City received the Idaho Code f) 31-3201A(b)
and (c) $5.00 city general fund c o w fee allocation and the $2.50 city capital facilities court Tee
allocation. (R., p. 64; R. Ex. 19, Second Navarro Aff., para. 21-22)
c. By 1983 the District Court Moved All Misdemeanors, etc., to Barrister.
Initially the Barrister facility handled only Boise City cases, but that soon changed. In
1983, Ada County Administrative Judge Warren H. Gilmore directed that all misdemeanors,
animal control, parking, open container, tobacco, drinking violations, infractions, Fish and Game
violations, Outfitter and Guide violations, water and watercraft violations, bicycle and pedestrian
violations and littering cases would be conducted at Barrister. @., p. 88, Ex. 29, Ailen Aff., Ex.
F.) All other misdemeanors not listed were to be filed in ihe magistrate's division at the county
courthouse. Walk-in arraignments for Boise City, Ada County, Meridian and Garden City were
to be conducted at Barrister. Id.
d. Ada County Provided Staff in 1989 Due to the Growing Magistrate Court
System.
In 1989, the Trial Court Administrator approached the Ada County Clerk and requested
that Ada County employ a manager supervisor at the Barrister c o q . (R. p. 88, Ex. 19, Second

E
Navarro Aff., para. 13.) Ada County eventually contributed clerks and a supervisor at Barrister
due to "the growing magistrate court system". (R., p. 64; R. Ex. 19, Second Navarro Aff., para.
13; R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff, Ex. I)
e. Discussion of Merger of Barrister Employees Began Around 1991.

JJI the late '80s the concept of a consolidated courthouse was mulled over. In 1990 the

Ada County Commissioner's purchased 14.5 acres of property at Third and Front Streets for
building a new courthouse. (R., pp. 65 - 66; R. Ex. 11, Simmons Aff.) This was the first official
step in laying a foundation for a consolidated courthouse in Ada Cou~ty. The next step was
consolidation of court enlployies. In a letter by the Ada County Trial Court Administrator
(TCA),' John Traylor, relates he met on September 10, 1991, with Ada County representatives
Ted Argyle, Terry .Tohnsonz and Dave Navarro to discuss the County taking over Boise City's
employees at traffic court. (R., p. 88, Ex. 29, Allen Aff., Ex. K, p. I.) In the letter, which was
titled "Traffic Court Personnel Merger," the TCA recounts the 1991 meeting explaining that all
of the Ada County meeting participants agreed the merger needed to take place. The TCA
instructed the City to make the next move so the merger was ready for the upcoming fiscal year.
He also suggested revisions to a 1989 draft proposal transferring the City's Barrister employees
over to the County. Id.
f. Discussions in 1992 with Other Cities in Ada County Proved Fruitless.
111

1992, the TCA, began discussions with Garden City and Meridian to obtain their

contribution to the cost of providing the Barrister facility. The TCA fully understood that the
facility should not be funded solely by Boise residents. One month

& to the merger letter

!

written to Boise City, the TCA wrote letters to the mayors of ~ & b i a nand Garden City in an
attempt to get thein to provide funding for Barrister employees. (R. p. 88, R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff,

'

The TCA is a position first created by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 1970s with a federal
grant. MERLINS. YOUNGET AL., JUSTICE
FOR THE TIMES:A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE IDAHO
STATECOURTS,188 (Carl F. Bianchi, ed., Idaho Law Foundation, 1990).
Director of Ada County Human Resources.

Ex. 1 and J.)

The TCA explained to the mayors that Barrister was used by every law

enforcemei~tentity in Ada County and Boise City was footing most of the bill:
[All1 traEfic citations, fonnal misdemeanor complaints and any other
citation issued by an Idaho law enforcement officer in Ada County are
processed through the Ada CountyIBoise City Traffic Court . . . . That
building was built in 1980 by Boise City. . . in compliance with an Order
of the District Court to provide the building, staff and necessary supplies
and equipment to operate an adequate court facility. Each year, Boise City
provides approximately $663,000 for operation of the Traffic Court, 20
city-paid full-time employees . . . and equipment and supplies. In addition,
more funds are budgeted for the operation and maintenance of the building
and grounds.

Id. p. 1. The TCA and Boise City worlced well together. As he explained to the mayors in 1992,
Boise City had funded most of his requests:
Since I assumed my positioil with the court in 1984, with the exception of
one year, I have asked Boise City for funding additional clerical staff
every budget year. For the most part, they have been very generous and
understanding.

Id. p. 2. The TCA pushed the mayors to pay just enough to staff their portion, not maintenance
and operating expenses. Neither Garden City nor Meridian agreed to reimburse Ada County for
Barrister employees. Their respective mayors either "refused to budget sufficient funds or have
indicated they [did] not have sufficient funds." (K. p. 88, R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff., Ex. L.)

g. Boise City and Ada County File a Petition to Get Meridian and Garden City
to Contribute.
!
.i

Working on the assumption the District Court could force contribution, the TCA
confidentially suggested that the City and County file a joint petition for contribution requesting
an appointment of "a Special Master to gather facts and make recoinmendation to the Court." Id.
He had already "received authority for payment of a Special Master." Id

Complying with the TCA's suggestion, Ada County and Boise City jointly filed a petition
on June 21, 1994, with the TCA asking for contribution from Meridian and Garden City. (R. p.
88, R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff, Ex. M.)

On August 12, 1994, the district judges of the Fourtl~Judicial District entered an order
requiring Garden City and Meridian to provide quarters, facilities, equipme~tt,staff, supplies and
other expenses for a "magistrate's division of the District Court." Neither city complied with the
Order. (R., pp. 64 - 65; R. Ex. 20, Second Reiner Aff., Ex. A; R. Ex. 29, Allen Aff., Ex. L)
h. A Consolidated Courthouse Concept was Adopted in 1994.

Also in 1994 a plan had been adopted for a "consolidated" courthouse which would
house all of the district courts and magistrate courts in Ada County. (R., pp. 65 - 66; R. Ex. 11,
Simmons Aff. ) In 1996 the voters of Ada County approved the County Cormnissio~~ers'
concept
when they voted to approve an advisory question contained on the primary election ballot:
If there is NOT an increase in property taxes, do you favor the
construction of a Consolidated Courthouse and Administration Center
through a public-private partnership?

i. In 1999 Boise City and Ada County Enter into an Agreement to Consolidate
Court Employees and Functions under One Roof.

Before ground was broken for the new Ada County Couqouse, Boise City and Ada
'I

County finally entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on October 1, 1999. (R., pp.
65 - 66; R. Ex. 19, Ex. C to Second Navarro Aff.; R. Ex. 11, Simmons Aff., R. Ex. 12, Walker
Aff,, para. 5) This appears to be the consummation of the 1991 "Traffic Court Personnel
Merger".

In the MOA, Boise City and Ada County agreed that it was in the best interests of the
community to consolidate court employees and Functions under one roof.

Ada County

represented that it:
has elected to provide at its sole cost and expense a single courthouse
complex for both the District Court and the Magistrate's Division thereof,
including the functions of the Distcict Court, both civil and criminal, and
probate court, police court and justice courts as those functions existed
prior to judicial reorganization . . .;
(R. Ex. 19, Ex. C to Second Navarro Aff.)
In that same 1999 MOA, Boise City agreed, subject to review and renegotiation, to
provide funding to Ada County for municipal court employees who were transferred to Ada
County as well as provide funding for maintenance and operating costs and equipment. (R. Ex.
19, Ex. C to Second Navarro Aff.) The MOA was approved by a Resolution of the Boise City
Council. (R. Ex. 19, Ex. D to Second Navarro Aff.)
j. Consolidated Courthouse Opens in 2002.

In 2002, the Ada County Courthouse opened and the Barrister court facility closed. (R.,
pp. 66 - 67) The Ada County Courthouse is a County facility and the City of Boise has no
ownership in the facility. (R., p. 66) While Boise City was providing the Barrister facility, it
received the $5.00 and the $2.50 fees authorized by Idaho Code

3 31-3201AP) and (c) for all
J

cases filed at the Barrister facility. (R., p. 64; R. Ex. 19, Second N d v k o Aff., para. 22; R. Ex. 7,
Faw Aff., para. 3) After the Barrister court functions were consolidated into the new Ada
County Courthouse, Boise City stopped receiving these fees. (R., p. 67) Ultimately, however,
Ada County agreed to give Boise City a "credit" equivalent to the $5.00 fee. Boise City still does

not receive the $2.50 fee because the facility is not a City-owned facility. (R., p. 67; R. Ex. 19,
Second Navarro Aff., para. 23; R. Ex. 7, Faw Aff., para. 4; R. Ex. 10, Rock Aff., para. 7 & 8)
k. Attempts to Renegotiate Agreement.
The 1999 MOA has never been reviewed or renegotiated. (R., Ex. 14, Simmons Aff.)
Boise City's share of the funding for the Magistrate Court under the 1.999MOA is approximately
between $750,000 - $800,000lyear and approximately $200,00Oiyear for trial court administrator
fees associated with the Magistrate Court. (R., Ex. 1, Navarro Aff. dated 10112i07, para. 5; R.,
Ex. 2, Reiner Aff. dated 10i12107, para. 3; R., Ex. 13, Bower Aff.) Part of this obligation is paid
by the $5.00 "credit" but the majority of Boise City's payment is paid from property tax
revenues in its general fund. (R., Ex. 13, Bower Aff., para. 10; R., Ex. 7, Faw Aff., para. 4; R.,
Ex. 8, Houde Aff.)
After the decision in Twin Falls County v. City of Twin Falls, 143 Idaho 398 (2006),
Boise City sought unsuccessfully lo review and renegotiate the 1999 MOA with Ada County.
(R., Ex. 29, Ex. P and Q to Allen Aff.) At approximately the same time the City of Boise filed
its Petition to set aside an Administrative Order dated October 9, 1980, it stopped making
payments to Ada County. (R., p. 67) The validity of the 1999 MOA and its enforcement were
not before the District Court and were not decided by the District Court in its Memorandum
Decision and Order. (R., p. 48)

J,

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Where Ada County provides tbe physical facilities and other amenities for the

1.

magistrate division, can the district judges in the Fourth Judicial District legally order
Boise City to continue to also provide facilities and other amenities for the magistrate
division when no additional or different facilities are needed?
Whether the district judges erred in holding that the continuation of the 1980 Order

2.

requiring Boise City to provide the county magistrate court facility and functions was
constitutional.
Whether the district judges of the Fourth Judicial District erred in allowing Ada

3.

County to intervene.
Whether the district judges of the Fourt11 Judicial District imposed an erroneous

4.

burden of proof upon the City of Boise.
Whether the district judges of the Fourth Judicial District failed to properly and

5.

thoroughly evaluate the necessity of the 1980 Order pursuant to law.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION AND THE FACTUAL NECESSITY FOR THE
1980 ORDER NO LONGER EXIST WHICH REQUIRES THAT IT BE
VACATED.
5

1.

Standard of Review.

E

This issue iilvolves the interpretation of Idaho Code §$ 1-2217, 1-2218 and 31-3201A.
The decision in Twin Falls County, identified the correct standard of review:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the
statute's literal words. Where the language of a statute is plain and urranlbiguous,
courts give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory

construction. In other words, where statute is clear, legislative history and other
extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly
expressed intent of the Legislature.
Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 399 (citations omitted).
2.

Legal Analysis and Argument.

The Fourth Judicial District Judges, sitting en banc, decided that since the 1980 Order
does not require the City of Boise to pay a pro rata share of the cost of operating and maintaining
the Ada County Courthouse, the Order does not violate this Court's holding in Twin Falls
County and should not he vacated. This rationale fails to achowledge the undisputed fact that
today Ada County provides the building which houses the magistrate's division in Ada County.
The Judges paid lip service to this fact by acknowledging that circumstances had, indeed,
changed but reasoned that because "Boise City accounts for the greatest percentage and the
greatest number of misdemeanor and inkaction filings in Ada County" such fact "alone militates
against setting aside the Court's Order of October 9, 1980." The decision simply does not square
with the statutory scheme which governs the undisputed facts in this case.
It is undisputed that since 2002 Ada County has owned the building which currently
Under the 1971 Order and under the 1980

houses the magistrate's division for Ada

Order Boise City provided the building and the expenses associatelfi with operating magistrate
courtrooms to handle its cases. Now Ada County provides the building and there is no legal
justification for continuance of the Order. In Twin Falls County, this Court explained:

'

The only exception is that juvenile proceedings are handled in separate facilities, but this fact
does not change the analysis or the decision. (R., p. 64, L. 10; p. 65, Ls. 16 - 17; p. 66, L. 20)
10

LC. $5; 1-2217 and 2218 do not envision entwined -or shared facilities and
expenses. The entity which provides the building also provides the expenses
associated with operating it. Thus, the district judges only had the authority to
order the Cities to provide courthouse facilities.
143 Idaho at 400.
In Twin Falls County, just as it is in Ada County since 2002, there was only one
courthouse facility which housed both the district court and the magistrate's division of the
district court. The statutory scheme, and the decision in Twin Falls County, envisions in such a
situation that there is no legal basis or justification for an Idaho Code 5; 1-2218 Order requiring
the cities in such a county to provide magistrate facilities. The Order in Twin Falls County went
beyond the language of Idaho Code 5; 1-2218 and actually ordered the cities to pay a
proportionate share of the cost of operating the magistrate's division. The Fourth Judicial
District Judges in this case reasoned that because the 1980 Order did not require Boise City to
pay a proportionate share of the expenses, the decision in Twin Falls County was not controlling.
Boise City disagrees.
The only justification for an Idaho Code 5; 1-2218 Order requiring Boise City to provide
magistrate facilities would be an actual necessity for such separate facility. The Fourth Judicial
District Judgcs did not find that separate facilities were feasible or necessary.4 There is, in fact,
no basis for such a finding. It is undisputed that the Ada County burthouse was built for the
specific purpose of providing a consolidated courthouse where both the district court and the
magistrate's division would be housed and, in fact, it has fimctioned since 2002 as a consolidated
During oral argument before thc Judges of the Fourth Judicial District, silting en banc, counsel
for Ada County suggested that additional separate facilities possibly made sense, but there was
no evidence presented on the necessity or feasibility of doing so and there were no findings by
the Judges on this issue. (Tr., p. 25, L. 3 - p. 26, L. 2)

courthouse. (R., pp. 11, 65 - 66; R. Ex. 11, Simnons Aff.) Unless the Fourth Judicial District
Judges intend to require Boise City to provide separate physical facilities for the magistrate's
division, Idaho Code

5

1-2218 does not provide the legal authority for entry of an Order

requiring Boise City to provide facilities and expenses for the magistrate's division.
Idaho Code

5

31-3201A(b) and (c) do not give cities and counties the authority to alter

the method by which the provider of the facilities is reimbursed from court fees. The current
reimbursement method employed by the Ada County Clerk in which Boise City is billed for a
proportion of the expenses for operation, of the magistrate's division and is credited for an
amount equivalent to the $5.00 reimbursement provided for in Idaho Code

5

31-3201A(b) and

(c) is patently invalid. The Fourth Judicial District Judges were incorrect when they held that
there was an "obligation" under the 1980 Order for Boise City to provide facilities or expenses.
After Ada County opened the new consolidated courthouse in 2002, it receives the $5.00 fee by
statute and pays the expenses for the magistrate's division. After Ada County began providing
the facilities, Boise City is not entitled to receive the Idaho Code 5 31-3201A(b) and (c) fees nor
is it obligatedto pay for the expenses of operating the magistrate's division. Twin Falls County,
143 Idaho at 401. ,("By ordering the Cities to reimburse the County, the district judges

impermissibly blurred the line between a facility provided by a co.unty and one provided by a
;
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city.") By holding that there was any continuing "obligation" under the 1980 Order after Ada
County began providing the facilities impermissibly blurred the line between a facility provided
by a county and one provided by a city.
Although the Fourth Judicial District Judges recognized that Boise's Petition did not
present the opportunity to adjudicate the validity or enforcement of the 1999 MOA, the Judges

were unable to separate the disputes between Boise City and Ada County over that agreement
from the questions presented in Boise's Petition. (R., p. 48) The only questions before the
Fourth Judicial District Judges was whether there was a legal basis or factual necessity to retain
the 1980 Order which required Boise City to provide the facilities and expenses for a
magistrate's division. The Fourth Judicial District Judges justified their decision by stating
"[Bloth the 1999 Agreement and the Boise City Council Resolution approving execution of the
Agreement acknowledged that Boise City remained obligated by the 1980 Order to continue to
provide suitable facilities for a magistrate's division of the district court." (R., p. 71)
There is no justification for linking the continuation of the 1980 Order to the enforcement
of the 1999 MOA because Twin-Falls County interpreted Idaho Code $5 1-2217 and 2218 as not
envisioning entwined or shared facilities and expenses. Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400
Prior to the 2006 decision in Twin Falls County, many understood Idaho Code

$5 1-2217 and

2218 as providing a legal basis for cities to reimburse counties for the operation of magistrate
courts in the county-provided

courthouse^.^

However, Twin Falls County changed that.

Whether the 1999 MOA has continuing validity or can be enforced was not before the District
Judges .of the Fourth Judicial District. It must stand or fall on its own in a separate proceeding.
The only question presented here is whether Boise City should continue to be ordered to provide
b

magistrate facilities when Ada County is providing those facilitiei. 4 The only answer which is

h he County argues the district judges were authorized to order reimbursernei~tbecause I.C. 5
1-2217 and LC. 5 1-2218 should be read together. Under the County's view, LC. 5 1-2217
requires that the County provide and pay for a magistrate c o d facility, which it has done and
will continue to do. However, under I.C. 1-2218, upon order of a majority of the district
judges, the Cities must either provide their own building or provide for use of the County
facilities by compensating the County for their proportionate share." Twin Falls County, 143
Idaho at 400.

consistent with the decision in Twin Falls County is "No." The 1971 Administrative Order was
entered. Boise City complied with that order by providing the Kootenai Street facility. The
1971 Order was replaced with the 1980 Administrative Order. Boise City complied with the
1980 Order by providing the Barrister facility. The Barrister facility no longer exists, thus the
legal justification and the factual necessity for the 1980 Order no longer exists. It should have
been vacated
B.

THE CONTINUATION OF THE 1980 ORDER, AND THE 2007 ORDER,
REQUIRING BOISE CITY TO PROVIDE MAGISTRATE COURT FACILITIES,
EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Constitutional questions are purely questions of law. Ada Cozrnty Zighway Dist. v. Total

Success Investments, 145 Idaho 360, 369 (2008). The standard of review is de novo. Id. "There
is a presumption in favor of constitutionality . . . and the burden of establishing that the statute or
regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers." American Falls Resewoiv Disr. No. 2.
v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,869 (2007).
The critical question in this case is whether the 2007 Order, the 1980 Order, and tbe
statute upon which they are based, are constitutional. The Fourth Judicial District Judges labeled
the constitutional issues raised by Boise City "creative." However, the constitutional questions
at issue are serious questions that deserve more than short shrift by the District Court - especially
i

when the issue is the court's own funding and its seemingly unque$t{onable authority to demand
it.

1.

The Orders and the statute upon which they are based are in direct violation
of Article VII, Section 5, of the Idaho Constitution.
a)

The Court Erred by Concluding that No Tax Is Levied on the Citizens
of Boise City.

The Fourth Judicial District Judges began their constitutional analysis by proclaiming:
"No tax was levied on the citizens of Boise City." (Mem. Order, p. 13.) Before reaching a legal
conclusion that no tax was levied, it would be prudent to first take into consideration the
definition of a tax. A tax is "a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs."
Bvewstev v. City of Pocatello, 11 5 Idaho 502, 505 (1 988). The Orders require the City of Boise
to provide facilities, equipment, staff, personnel, and other expenses of the county-wide
magistrate's division. This amounts to a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public
needs. Whether the City provides for the functions of the court at Barrister or at the new Ada
County Courthouse under an agreement is of no moment. The City's taxpayers are ordered to
pay. The City has no other means to obtain a stream of revenue for courts other than an ad
valorem tax. It is indeed a tax.

b)

The Court Erred by Concluding that the Tax Is Uniform and NonDuplicative.

The Fouith Judicial District Judges concluded that the taxes for courts in Ada County

.

i

are uniform and non-duplicative. Article VII, Section 5 of the Id& Constitution provides that
taxes shall be uniform and non-duplicative,
All tuxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the
territorial limits, ofthe authorily levying the tax, and shall be levied and
collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property . . . duplicate
taxation ofproperty for the same purpose during the same year, is hereby
prohibited.

(emphasis added.)
There is no disagreement that Ada County taxes all of its residents for court functions
in two ways. First, County taxpayers (including those in incorporated areas) pay an ad valorem
tax to the general fund, a portion of which pays for the fiulctions of the district court (of which
the magistratc division is a part).

Second, each taxpayer also pays a special levy which

"provid[es] for the functions of the district court and the magistrate division of the district court
within the county." Idaho Code

5

31-867(1) (empltasis added).6 In 2007 the special levy for

courts in Ada County was $3,016,808. (R. p. 87, Ex. 8, Houde Aff. Ex. I.)
(1)

Boise City taxpayers pay a duplicative court tax.

In addition to a general ad valorem tax and the special levy, Boise City taxpayers pay a
duplicate tax in order to comply with the Order. The Fourth Judicial District Judges concluded,
erroneously, that Boise City's payment to Ada County is 'proportionate' to its usage, and
therefore not 'duplicative'. The district judges provided no authority to support its
'use/proportionality test.'7 (Mem. Order, p. 14.) The test for whether a tax is duplicative is not
proportionality. Rather, the test is thepurpose of the tax. As articulated in Humbird Lumber Co.
v. Kootenai County, 79 P. 396 (Idaho 1904),
The prohibition . . . against duplicate taxation was yndoubtedly directed
against the taxing of the same property twice during the same year for the
same purpose, while other like and similar property is taxed only once
during the same period for the same purpose.
Id. at 398 (emphasis added). The key, then, is to first look at thepurpose of each tax. The tax
yet Boise City was still under the 1980 Order and was still providing the facility, equipment,
stafi; personnel, supplies and other expenses of the Magistrate's Division.
Moreover, the Court's own Order does not limit the City's contributions to only its
proportionate use. The Order requires the City to pay for the magistrate division in its entirety.

imposed by the 1980 Order - which mirrors the language of Idaho Code S; 1-2218 verbatim requires Boise City to tax its residents for the purpose of providing a facility, equipment,
personnel, etc., and other expenses for the functions of the Ada County District Court's
magistrate division. Likewise, the puipose of the special levy is to "provid[e] for the functions
of the district court and the magistrate division of the district court within the county" including
Idaho Code S; 31-867(1)

all court expenditures and the salaries of deputy court clerks.'

(emphasis added). With the exception of the facility requirement, the tax imposed by the Order
has the same purpose as the special levy's purpose - to provide a county magistrate facility.
Unlike any other county taxpayer, Boise taxpayers pay not only the general ad valorem taxes for
courts and the special court levy, but also a tax to comply with the 1980 Order by the Ada
County District Court. No other taxpayers in the County pay three times for the same purpose.
This coilstitutes a duplicative tax.
(2)

The Taxes for Ada County District Court Magistrate Division
Are Non-uniform.

The uniformity provision states that "[a]lltaxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects within the territorial limits, of the authority levying the tax. " The Fourth Judicial

District Judges erred when they proclaimed that, because Boise City's taxes are uniform
lhroughout the city, there is no uniformity problem. The analytical fjaw stems from proclaiming
i

Boise City as the "taxing authority" and the taxpayers of Boise as the "class of subjects."
Relating to the authority to fund the courts, a historical perspective is helpful. Prior to the
1970s, the Idaho courts were not consolidated. For instance, cities had municipal courts. A

An amendment to the special levy law in 1997 added the ability for the special court fund to
pay for all court functions (except a facility) irzcluding salaries of deputy court clerks. 1997
Idaho Sess. Laws p. 91.

constitutional amendment and statutory amendments changed that effective January 11, 1971.
Boise City's authority, along with all other cities throughout the state, to provide a court for its
taxpayers was repealed by the legislature in 1969 and effective in 1971. 1969 Idaho Sess. laws p.
344-346. Functions of the old municipal courts were transferred to the magistrate's division of

N
ET AL., JUSTICE
FOR THE TIMES:A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY
OF
the district court. M ~ R L IS.YOUNG
THE

IDAHOSTATECOURTS,176-177 (Carl F. Bianchi, ed., Idaho Law Foundation, 1990). The

magistrate courts' jurisdiction included the types of cases previously heard by probate, police,
justice and municipal courts. Later in the 1970s, the magistrate courts' jurisdiction expanded to
take on additional responsibilities of domestic relations, child support, child custody, parental
right's termination, and habeas corpus proceedings. JUSTICEFOR THE TIMES,at 182-18. These
responsibilities far exceed those of the former municipal courts.

(a) The Taxing Authority is with the District Court, Not the
City of Boise.
The authority to force contributions from a city for court functions is found not in Title
50 (Municipal Corporations) of the Idaho Code; rather, it is found in Title 1 (Courts and Court
Officials). Idaho Code 3 1-2218 does not provide a city with taxing authority. Title 1 confers on
the county district judges the authority to make the decision that a city will provide for the
functions of the magistrate court. The district judges, by a majoGfy vote, can order a city to
i

provide court functions. Once that decision is made, a city has no discretion. The statute is
mandatory (and apparently ad infiniturn). Once the district judges enter an order, the result is
necessarily a tax. The taxing authority to initiate the magistrate court to be funded by city
taxpayers rests with the Ada County District Court.

The district judges discussed Independent School Dist. No. 6 v. Common School Dist. No.
38, 64 Idaho 303 (1942), to arrive at the conclusion the tax is unifonn. ZSD No. 6 is easily

distinguishable. It involved a school district which was statutorily authorized to enter into
contracts with other school districts to provide schooling.

Upon the "initiative and the

agreement" of the school district's own board of trustees, School District No. 6 entered into a
contract to provide schooling for the pupils of two other independent school districts in exchange
for payment. Later, School District No. 6 argued, partly upon the uniformity clause, to recover
the difference between the per capita cost and what the other districts had paid. The Court held
thestatute and the contract were not in violation of the uniformity clause. The statute conferred
the authority and power on the district trustees to combine with another school district for the
purpose of education. The arrangement "imposed no additional tax, imposition or burden." Id. at
789.
Unlike the school district in ZSD No. 6, the city is not statutorily authorized to provide
court facilities and functions. Rather, another entity, the district judges, is authorized to ordev
the city to provide court facilities and functions. The school district arrangement involved the
purpose for which school districts exist - to educate students. The district judges' Order imposes
additional taxes and burdens upon the city taxpayers to pay for a purpose for which cities are no

.i

longer authorized.. Finally, unlike the independent school district2 &ho did not share the saine
taxpayers, the City's taxpayers live in, and already pay taxes to, the County for court purposes.
This Court has explained: "[Ilf there is any ground for the interest of a county in the
spending of money, it must be a county purpose to authorize the levy and the levy must be
unifonn throughout the county." Idaho County v. Fenn Highway District, 43 Idaho 233, 378

(1926). The case at bar is closer to Fenn, wherein Idaho County attempted to compel the Fenn

highway district to repair part of the highway within the boundaries of the district. 'The district
refused. The Supreme Court held that the county had no autl~orityto do so. The Court explained
that taxes levied by a county must be unifonn. Id. at 378. If the county has authority to spend the
money, it must be for a county purpose. Id. Simply put, providing district magistrate courts are a
county purpose and the taxes for that purpose must be uniform within the county.
On the other hand, should this Court determine that courts are a city purpose, the statute
is still constitutionally infirm. The Fenn Court articulated that the uniformity requirement works
hand-in-hand with Article VII, Section 6, of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits the
legislature from imposing a tax on a city for city purposes. The provision implicitly prohibits the
legislature from doing indirectly what it cannot do directly. Id. at 378. As such, the legislature
cannot confer upon the district judges (or the county) the "power to initiate and impose a tax
up011 and for the purposes of the [city]." Id.
(b) The Class of Subjects Is All County Taxpayers.
The next question is whether the tax is uniform upon the same class of subjects. The
class of subjects is all taxpayers within the territorial limits of the county, not just the taxpayers
in Boise. There is only one magistrate division in each county. "[Tlhere is hereby established in
each county of the state of Idaho a magistrate division of the distiitt court." Idaho Code $ 12201. The magistrate division has jurisdiction throughout the entire county and serves a11
taxpayers within the county, whether in an incorporated city or in ail unincorporated area.9

It should be noted that magistrates are retained in county-wide elections in the county for which
the magistrate is a resident. Idaho Code $ 1-2220.

There is no Boise City Municipal court." Nor is there a Boise City Magistrate Division of the
Ada County District Court.

The uniformity provision requires all taxes on the same class of

subject to be uniform. This tax is not uniform
c.

The Orders and Idaho Code 5 1-2218 Violate Equal Protection.

Interestingly, the Fourth Judicial District Judges completely failed to provide an equal
protection analysis. For equal protection in tax cases, the rational basis test is the appropriate
standard. Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, 117 Idaho 1002, 1004 (1989). An act of the
legislature is presumed to be constitutional, but whether the act is reasonable or arbitrary or
discriminatory is a question of law for determination by this Court. Id. at 1003
The equal protection analysis is in two steps. The first step is to determine if there is a
conceivable public purpose. The City willingly concedes that providing county magistrate court
fulctions and facilities is a public purpose.
The second step is to determine whether the classification is reasonably related.
The principle underlying the equal protection clauses of both the Idaho
and United States Constitutions is that all persons in like circumstances
should receive the same benefits and burdens of the law. This Court has
held that a classification for tax purposes is reviewed on the rational basis
test. The rational basis test requires that a statutory classification be
rationally related to a legitimate government objective.
Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, 117 Idaho at 1004 (citations omitted).

'
1

;,

The City disputes the classification both in the statute and as applied in the orders. The
purpose of the statute is to provide

magistrate court facilities and Iunctions; yet the

classification authorizes a court to order only city residents to provide for the county magistrate

l o Indeed, oi~ly
the Legislature has the authority to provide for the establishment of a trial court
within a City. Idaho Const. art. V, § 14. This authority is non-delegable.

21

court. Ultimately, this results in classification between taxpayers within an incorporated area
which is under a

5

1-2218 order and all other taxpayers within the county. It is not rational to

classify one city's taxpayers as the providers of a county-wide magistrate court.
To make matters worse, the statute provides no standard upon which the district judges
should order one city to provide it and not another. In the 2007 Order, the Fourth Judicial
District Judges' after-the-factjustification is that "Boise City accounts for the greatest percentage
and the greatest number of misdemeanor and inkaction filings in Ada County." (Mem. Order at
I

12.) To be clear, Boise City accounts for about 51% of misdemeanors and infractions. Wem.
Order at 8.) To state the obvious, this means the rest of the cities, the county, etc., account for
49% of the misdemeanors and infractions filed in the Ada County magistrate court.
Idaho Code § 1-2218 articulates no such 'proportionality' standard.

The statute

empowers district judges to order any city of any size, with no mention of proportionality, to
provide magistrate court quarters, etc., for the entire county. For all other county purposes, taxes
are borne by all coul~tyresidents. Location of a taxpayer's property within a city is not a
legitimate tax classification for imposition of a tax to support a county-wide magistrate court.
No special benefit accrues to a taxable parcel within an "ordered" city as opposed to taxable
parcels outside an "ordered" city. See Richmond Courzty v. Richmond County Business Assoc.,
3

i

228 Ga. 281 (197.1) (holding an ordinance in violation of equal prbhction where the ordinance
assessed fees on businesses within a county, but outside of municipality where the revenue from
fees supported services for a11 county residents including those in municipalities and the burden
of the tax was "classified geographically" with no reasonable basis.)

County residents who reside witlzin the City of Boise are being treated differently than
county residents who reside outside the City of Boise. Boise City taxpayers are shouldering
more of the burden. The classification is clearly arbitrary and not reasonably related to the
purpose. The statute violates the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Idaho constitutions.
Even if this Court finds the classification is not unreasonable, the statute and orders are
being applied by the district judges in violation of equal protection. Other cities similarly situated
are not treated the same.
As explained in 1994, the Fourth District Judges ordered Garden City and Meridian to
provide suitable and adequate quarters for the magistrate's division, as well as staff, personnel,
equipment, etc. (Reiner Second Aff., Ex. A, Aug. 12, 1994, Order.) They did not comply.

In March of 1995, the Trial Courl Administrator ("TCA") wrote to the City Attorneys for
Garden City and Meridian to inform them the Order was still in effect.
On February 27, 1995, the District Judges of the Fourth Judicial District
met and confirmed that their previous Order issued August 12, 1994
requiring your client cities to provide suitable quarters, etc., for the
magistrate division is still in effect and expected to be complied with, and
directed that 1 contact each of you regarding this matter.
(Allen Aff., Ex. 0, March 8, 1995, Letter from TCA to Attorneys of Garden City and Meridian.)
The TCA agreed to honor an Administrative Judge's determination to extend the Order until
i

October 1, 1995. Again, Garden City and Meridian did not compll.. The TCA recalls that he
"determined not to further pursue this matter with Garden City and the City of Meridian." (R. p.
88, R. Ex. 25, Traylor Aff., para. 13.) The Garden Citymeridian administrative order has not

been enforced by the district judges. only the administrative Order against the City of Boise has
ever been enforced by the district judges.

The district judges fail to articulate a reasonable justification for the disparate treatment.
They merely state the Garden City and Meridian order "ivas not implemented, although there was
no formal order vacating or rescinding the Order." (Mem. Decision at 6) (emphasis added).
While the equal protection clause does not require that all persons be treated identically,
distinctions in treatment between those similarly situated must rest on "some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975). Merely not being "implemented" is not a ground of difference.

As applied, the disparate treatment of the administrative orders in question singles out the City
and taxpayers of Boise, who are similarly situated to those in Garden City and Meridian, for no
rational reason. The orders as applied fail an equal protection analysis.
C.

THE DISTRICT JUDGES' DECISION TO ALLOW ADA COUNTY TO
INTERVENE IN THE CITY'S PETITION TO SET ASIDE ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER WAS ERROR.
Before the County was ever a party to this petition, the Ada County District

Adnlinistrative Judge requested that the City serve Ada County with the City's Petition to Set
Aside the 1980 Order. The judge's clerk called the City and requested service on Ada County.
The City coinplied as directed. (Colaianni Letter to Hon. Darla Williamson, dated 912012007
attached hereto as Attachment 1.) Before the County was a party and before it had even inoved
j

to intervene, the Ada County Court provided the County with notidecof a hearing in this matter.

(R. p. 16 - 17.) Shortly thereafter, the County moved to intervene. The motion was granted.

1.

Standard of Review.

The standard of review for granting a motion to intervene in an administrative order of
district judges appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho. Article V,

3 9 provides the

Supreme Court jurisdiction to review "any decision of the district courts, or judges thereof," No
standard of review is established in this section of Idaho's Constitution. Further, Idaho Code
provides no clear standard of review when an appeal is taken from a decision of the district
judges of the Fourth Judicial District pursuant to Idaho Code

5

1-2218. Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure l(a) applies in all "actions, proceedings and appeals of a civil nature." The Petition
filed by the City of Boise concerns an administrative order directing the City to provide
magiskate facilities. The 1980 Order was not the result of a civil action, proceeding or appeal.

In absence of a clear legal standard of review, it is for this Court to determine how and
whether the district judges fulfilled their obligation under the law. "The specific standards
governing review.. .depend upon the nature of the power exercised in making the decision." City

of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 693 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing
Coopev v. Board of County Commissioizers ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980)).
2.

Idaho requires an "action" be filed before an intervention may be permitted.

The earliest Idaho case cited for the proposition that the right to intervene requires an
, i

underlying action was decided in 1869 by the Supreme Court of thk ferritory of Idaho. Glidden
v. Green, 1 Idaho 235 (1 869). Green explains that "[tlhe right to intervene has been taken from
the code of Louisiana, and adopted into our practice." Id. And the "statute uses the word 'action'
in speaking of the right to intervene." Id. Specifically, the territorial judiciary adopted this code
as follows:

Section 601, p. 204, Laws of Idaho, first session, says: 'Any person shall be
entitled to intervene in an action who has an interest in the matter in
litigation ...An intervention talces place when a third person is permitted to
become apavty to an action between other persons. . . .'
Id. (emphasis added.)
Some 22 years after the Territorial Supreme Court made its ruling in Green and about a
year afier statehood, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled "[a]n action cannot be pending until it has
been commenced. Civil actions in the courts are commenced by filing a complaint." Gold Huntev
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Holleman, 2 Idaho 839, 27 P. 4113 (1891). where there is no
underlying case there can be no intervention.
As with case law, an historical survey of state and federal intervention statutes from
statehood to the present shows no substantial changes in the law: absent an underlying action
there can be no intervention, whether mandatory or permissive. Accordingly, and as a matter of
long-standing and well-settled case and statutory law, the County's Motion to Intervene should
have been denied.
3.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24 also requires an "action."

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) and 24(b) begin with identical language: "Upon
timely application anyone shall be pennitted to intervene in an action." (emphasis added).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a) states "A civil action is 'cgmmenced by the filing of a
'!
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complaint with the court . . .," (emphasis added).
The City has filed no complaint upon which the County should have been pennitted to
intervene. There was simply no actiorz (i.e., complaint or lawsuit) filed by the City against any
person or entity upon which intervention could attach. The City merely filed a petition to the
district judges requesting them to set aside, quash, or vacate a purely administrative order the
26

district judges issued 28 years ago directing the City to provide courtroom facilities for the
Magistrate's Division. There is no evidence to suggest the County was permitted to intervene 28
years ago.
4.

The County's attempt to impose itself into a purely administrative function
of the district judges was an impermissible interference with the
administrative duties of the judiciary.

The 28-year old Order the City petitioned the court to set aside was issued by the
majority of the district judges pursuant to the statutory authority found at Idaho Code

5 1-2218

dealing with facilities and equipment provided by the city.
Any city in the state shall, upon order of a majority of the district judges in
the judicial district, provide suitable and adequate quarters for a
magistrate's division of the district court, including the facilities and
equipment necessary to make the space provided functional for its
intended use, and shall provide for the staff personnel, supplies, and other
expenses of the magistrate's division.
The power to issue orders and make changes to them is found at Idaho Code 5 1-1603(8)
which permits the court to "amend and control its process and orders, so as to make them
confonnable to law and justice." The Order only involves Boise City and the district judges of
the Fourth Judicial District, not Ada County. The statutory authority for the Order is Idaho Code

5 1-2218 which only involves the relatioilship between a city and a majority of the district judges
in the judicial district. Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400. ~ d a g o u n t yhad no authority to
1
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address or interfere in the decision making process contemplated by Idaho Code 5 1-2218.

D.

THE DISTRICT JUDGES OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IMPOSED
AN ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF PROOF UPON THE CITY.
The court in its Memorandum Decision and Order established a standard of proof as set

forth in Noble v. Fishev, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894 P.2d 118 (1995), which was to demonstrate
"good and sufficient cause" to set aside the Order. Noble involved a divorce proceeding. The
Petition filed by the City is an administrative matter. It is clear in divorce proceedings that Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and Idaho Code $ 32-709 apply. It is also clear in civil litigation
that Rule 60(b) governs. There is no authority for the proposition that Rule 60(b) applies in a
purely administrative matter. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l(a) does not provide authority for
the proposition that the rules apply to administrative hearings. The court erred in erroileously
and arbitrarily imposing such a burden of proof on the City
The District Judges' imposition of a burden of proof is in error. The City of Boise was
provided no notice that it had a burden of proof, let alone the significant burden of demonstrating
good and sufficient cause. This amounts to a violation of the City's due process rights. Because
the subject of the City's Petition was an administrative order &on1 the District Judges of the
Fourth Judicial District, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply. No court rule or
statutes other than Idaho Code

$5

1-2217 and 1-2218 establish a burden of proof upon the City.

Further, there is no indication in either statute that a City has ally burden other than coming
!
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forward to the Court and requesting re-examination of the necessity of the Order.
E.

THE DISTRlCT JUDGES HAD AN OBLIGATION TO ANALYZE THE
ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE STATUTE AND CONSIDER CHANGED
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Idaho Code

5

1-2217 malces it very clear that in Idaho, counties have the obligation to

provide suitable and adequate quarters for the magistrate's division of the district court. Only

upon action of the majority of the district judges pursuant to Idaho Code $ 1-2218 does a city
receive that obligation. Comn~onsense would dictate, in absence of statutory guidance to the
contrary, that the court, when faced with such a decision would look to the words of the statute
for guidance regarding the issues to be considered. Here, Idaho Code

$4

1-2217 and 1-2218

refers to "suitable and adequate" facilities. Upon a request for relief from an Idaho Code $ 12218 Order, it is incumbent upon the district judges, as the administrative apparatus of the court
system, to analyze the adequacy of the existing facility. The judges must be convinced that the
existing facility is inadequate and that a city should be made to expend taxpayer funds to provide
an additional magistrate court facility. In this case, the judges neglected this duty.
The City argued the judges should consider a number of issues constituting changed
circumstances and warranted reconsideration of the 28-year old Order. The most significant
reason the circumstances Rave changed is the construction and operation of a new consolidated
courthouse in Ada County. A courthouse that was intended to house all of the magistrate judges
in Ada County, with the exception of those housed at the juvenile detention facility. When the
new courthouse opened in 2002, all magistrate matters previously held at the Barrister facility
were moved to that facility. The court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order, found that the
City allowed, "the Barrister courthouse functions to be transferred to the new Ada County

'

Courthouse." (Mem. Order, p. 1 I , Ls. 18-19) No evidence was &vkrprovided to demonstrate
that the City had any authority to determine where the magistrate judges of the Fourth Judicial
District were chambered. This decision was solely that of the Trial Court Administrator and the
Adininistrative Judge. The City of Boise had and has no authority to tell the judicial branch of
government how to operate.

The court determined that the City of Bo~seopted to pay some costs to Ada County and is
somehow now foreclosed forever from requesting the court reconsider the 1980 Order based
upon changed circumstances. The court cites no authority for the propositioil that the City has
missed its opportunity to request the reconsideration of this 28-year old Order. By its very
nature, an administrative order may hecoine obsolete, antiquated or unnecessary based upon
population growth or recession, technology and other intervening administrative decisions. The
court simply must be willing to review the necessity of administrative orders, particularly 28year old orders.
The court concludes that the City entered into an agreement with the County in 1999 and
that this agreement serves to satisfy the City's obligation under the 1980 Order. Further, the
court finds that, "[tlhe decision by Boise City to fulfill its obligation to provide suitable
magistrate's facilities by contracting with Ada County is not an appropriate basis to set aside the
October 9, 1980 Order." (Mem. Order, p. 12, Ls. 9-11) The court misses the point with this
analysis. While the City concedes it entered into an agreement in 1999, the reality is that since
that time, circumstances have changed significantly and the interpretation of the law has
changed. All of the taxpayers of Ada County have paid for a new consolidated court facility
which currently houses all of the magistrate duties of the County, except for juvenile. It is
.i

absolutely appropriate and prudent to request the District Court Judg'es revisit the 1980 Order as
the circumstances that: caused the Order to come into existence are drastically different than
those now existing.
The court points out that the City has a substantial portion of the magistrate court
caseload. Based upon this fact alone, the cout finds it unpalatable to set aside the Order. No

authority was provided for the court's finding that the City's caseload warrants continuation of a
28-year old Order to provide facilities. Noticeably absent in the court's analysis is any mention
of the adequacy of the new Ada County Courthouse to process the current caseload. The court
made not one finding that there were not enough magistrate courtrooms, or that the buildirtg is
somehow unable to accommodate thepersonnel necessary to process the current caseload. There
is nothingin Idaho Code

5

1-2218 to authorize the court to arbitrarily consider caseload alone

and neglect the suitability and adequacy of the current courthouse.
In its Decision and Order, the court ultimately co~lcludesthat, "Boise City has failed to
meet its burden in demonstrating that there is sufficient and good cause to set aside the October
9, 1980 Order. Accordingly, the Petition of Boise City is denied." (Mem. Order, p. 16, Ls. 3-5)
The court failed in its responsibility to administer the court system in Ada County. No inquiry or
analysis was conducted regarding the significant change in circumstances since October 9, 1980.
No consideration was made regarding the size and condition of the existing Ada County
Courthouse. No discussions of the fact that the current facility was built to accommodate all of
the magistrate judges for the County, except juveilile magistrates, was had.
The court appeared pre-disposed at the outset to make this process somekng not
contemplated by Title 1, Idaho Code. Instead of treating the City's Petition as an administrative

'

matter between the court and the City, the subject of the Order, thd court made the process to
look more like civil litigation. Instead of engaging in a meaningful and comprehensive analysis
of the suitability and adequacy of the existing courthouse, the court focused upon caseloads and a
10-year old agreement between the City and County that was not the subject of this matter.
lnstead of considering the numerous changed circumstances of the 28 years since the Order was

put into place, the court focused on some notion of equity not contemplated by Idaho Code 5 12218.

Instead of focusing on whether or not the Order was necessary for the proper

administration of justice in Ada County, the court was co-opted by the County's assertion that
this is a zero sum game. This is not a matter of us versus them, as both the City and the County
represent the taxpayers. The reality is that County taxpayers are mostly City taxpayers as well,
and all deserve the court's serious consideration of the City's Petition so not as to unnecessarily
expend taxpayer dollars.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments and analysis set forth above, the City of Boise respectfully
requests this Court find Idaho Code

1-2218 unconstitutional, further find that Ada County was

not entitled to intervention, and set aside the 1980 Administrative Order.
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In Re: Facilities and Equipment Provided by the City of Boise
Case No. CV OT 2007- 16638

Dear Judge Willliamson:
Please be advised that I received a phone message from your clerk today about the
above-captioned matter, requesting that we serve Ada County with the City's
Petition filed herein on September 14,2007.
We did not serve the County for several reasons. First, the Order at issue was
directed exclusively at the City of Boise by the Fourth District Judges, sitting at
that time. The court and cause of the Order states: "In Re: Facilities and
Equipment Provided By The City of Boise" and it refers solely to Idaho Code $ 1221 8 and the City of Boise's obligation at that time. The County was not a party
to that Order, nor does my copy indicate the County was served.
Second, the statute at issue leads us to the conclusion that this matter is, in law,
exclusively a matter between the majority of District Judges and the City of Boise
in relation to magistrate court facilities:
Any city in the state shall, upon order of a maiority of the
district judges in the judicial district, provid&suitable and
adequate quarters for a magistrate's division of the district
court, including the facilities and equipment necessary to
make the space provided functional for its intended use,
and shall provide for the staff personnel, supplies, and other
expenses of the magistrate's division. (emphasis added).
Idaho Code 5 1-2218.
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Hon. Darla Williamson
September 20,2007

Of course, it is the City's position in its Petition that, in accordance with the Idaho Supreme
Court's holding in Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Fulls and Filer, 146 P.3d 664 (2006),
that the County has the statutory obligation under Idaho Code $ 1-2218 to provide the court
facilities along with associated operational costs. The outstanding Order at issue in this
matter is now moot as Ada County has provided the consolidated court facility and now
owns the building that formerly housed the magistrate court facility built as a result of the
Order.
Finally, although Twin Falls County was a party in Twin Fulls County v. Cities of Twin Falls
and Filer, it was so because the Fifth Judicial District Court's order in that case specifically
directed the cities to reimburse Twin Falls County. That is not the case with the Order at
hand.
We do realize that the City had a contract with the County that is related, hut we believe that
to be a separate matter. As a courtesy, however, we have now sent a copy of the City's
petition to the County's attorney.
Finally, we enclose a proposed order for the Fourth District Judges in relation to the City's
Petition. If the Corn has m h e r direction, please do not hesitate to advise my office.

CBCldga
Enc.
c. Ted Argyle
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV OT 2007-1 6638

IN RE: FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
PROVIDED BY THE CITY OF BOISE

/

ORDER

Pursuant to Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 145 P.3d
664 (2006), the Order dated October 9, 1980, is hereby satisfied, mooted, and otherwise set
aside.
DATED this

day of

,2007.

Honorable Darla J. Williamson
Administrative District Judge

Honorable Deborah Bail
District Judge

Honorable Michael McLaughlin
District Judge

Honorable Ronald Wilper
District Judge

Honorable Kathryn Sticklen
District Judge

Honorable Mike Wetherell
District Judge

Honorable Cheri Copsey
District Judge

Honorable Thomas Neville
District Judge

Honorable Patrick Owen
District Judge

ORDER - 1
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of September, 2007, served the

I hereby certify that I have on this
foregoing Order as follows:

Cary B. Colaianni
City Attorney
City of Boise
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701-0500

0 U.S. Mail
Personal Delivery
0 Facsimile
0 Other:

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of District Court
By:
Deputy Clerk

ORDER - 2
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